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Rising to the Level of Climate Science: 
Rhode Island, the National Flood 
Insurance Program, and Sea Level 
Rise Projections 
Nicole E. Rohr, PhD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rhode Island is the smallest state in the United States, but, 
with over one thousand people per square mile, it has the second 
highest population density.1  Homes, businesses, tourism centers, 
and industrial hubs are primarily located along Rhode Island’s 
over-four hundred miles of coastline, providing breath-taking 
views, easily accessible beaches, and convenient access to shipping 
channels; all of these vital economic sectors lie, at least in part, 
within flood-prone lands.2  These low-lying areas, especially the 
coastal areas at an elevation less than 4.9 feet above sea level, are 
vulnerable to severe coastal storms and coastal flooding.3  Homes 
 
*  Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law.  Nicole Rohr 
earned her PhD in Biological Sciences from the University of Rhode Island in 
2012.   
 1.   U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population Data: Population Density, 
U.S. CENSUS 2010, https://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-
dens-text.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).  Rhode Island has the fourth highest 
population density when U.S. territories are included with the states.  Id.  
 2.   HELEN MANNING, MICHELLE CARNEVALE & PAMELA RUBINOFF, RHODE 
ISLAND COASTAL PROPERTY GUIDE 2 (2014), http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Rhode-Island-Coastal-Property-Guide-2014.pdf. 
 3.   See R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, NATURAL HAZARDS: 
HURRICANES, FLOODS, AND SEA LEVEL RISE IN THE METRO BAY REGION SPECIAL 
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 14 (2009), http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives 
/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/5766.pdf. (“[The] 4.9-foot contour roughly 
represents the area that would be inundated during spring high water with a 
2.3-foot rise in sea level.  It appears very probable that such a rise will occur 
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and businesses in these areas must protect themselves from 
damages related to flooding, and primarily have one insurance 
option available: coverage through the federal government’s 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).4 
The NFIP is administered through the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).5  Established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 
the NFIP was created to offer flood insurance to properties with 
significant flood risk and to reduce the risk of future flooding by 
incentivizing floodplain management strategies.6  The NFIP is 
structured similarly to other risk-based insurance options (e.g., fire 
insurance, vehicle insurance, etc.) with one key difference: 
Congress has directed FEMA to heavily subsidize the program for 
structures that existed before the NFIP was implemented.7  This is 
because risk-based premiums are cost-prohibitive to most property 
owners in the floodplain.8  This has resulted in the subsidization of 
over twenty percent of NFIP policies, with an average premium rate 
of forty to forty-five percent of the actuarial risk-based cost; 
however, most of these subsidized policies are in the areas most 
prone to flooding, resulting in low-premium and high-loss claims 
that have plunged the program into a $23 billion debt to the United 
States Treasury.9  As a result of Superstorm Sandy, there was 
nearly $40 million in claims paid out in Rhode Island;10 that 
 
within the next 120 years.”).  
 4.   See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–
4131(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327); see generally JARED T. BROWN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO FEMA’S NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) (2016). 
 5.  § 4004 (Westlaw). 
 6.  Id. § 4001 (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 7.  Reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program, Part II: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Hearing] 
(statement of Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director Financial Markets 
and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.; BROWN, supra note 4, at 24. 
 10.  Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Federal Support for 
Rhode Island Sandy Recovery Exceeds $39.4 Million (June 11, 2013), 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/06/11/federal-support-rhode-island-
sandy-recovery-exceeds-394-million [hereinafter Press Release, Fed. 
Emergency Mgmt. Agency R.I. Fed. Support].  Sandy formed on October 22, 
2012, in the Atlantic Ocean and moved along Haiti, the Caribbean Islands, and 
the eastern seaboard of the United States before dissipating on October 31, 
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amount is a small portion of the over $8.1 billion paid out by the 
NFIP to all states affected by Sandy, including the two hardest hit 
states, New York and New Jersey.11 
This complex interaction between high-risk flood zones and 
high-loss claims will be exacerbated in the coming decades by 
climate change.12  For instance, rising air temperatures lead to 
warming sea surface temperatures, which, in turn, result in sea 
level rise and increased frequency of strong coastal storms.13  Over 
the last fifty years, sea levels in the northeast have been increasing 
three to four times faster than the global average, and Rhode Island 
is preparing for an increase of nine feet above 1990 sea levels by 
2100.14  In addition to this higher base sea level, climate change 
will lead to stronger coastal storms with higher associated storm 
 
2012. See Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com 
/2013/07/13/world/americas/hurricane-sandy-fast-facts/ (last updated Nov. 2, 
2016).  During this time, it peaked in strength as a category two hurricane over 
Haiti then fluctuated between a category one hurricane and a post-tropical 
cyclone as it moved north, ultimately being referred to as Superstorm Sandy 
in New England as it weakened from a hurricane before making landfall in 
New Jersey.  See id. 
 11.   The Flood Insurance Claims Process in Communities After Sandy: 
Lessons Learned and Potential Improvements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Housing, Transportation, & Community Development of the S. Comm. on 
Banking Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 33 (2014) (statement of Craig 
Fugate, Admin., Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of 
Homeland Security), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91460 
/pdf/CHRG-113shrg91460.pdf. 
 12.   See Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change: Rising 
Sea Levels Challenge the NFIP, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 19–20 (2014); 
AECOM, MICHAEL BAKER JR., INC. & DELOITTE CONSULTING, LLP, THE IMPACT 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100, at 5-1 to -28 (2013), 
http://www.acclimatise.uk.com/login/uploaded/resources/FEMA_NFIP_report.
pdf. 
 13.  John A. Church et al., Sea Level Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
1137, 1150 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), http://www.climatechange 
2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf; P.J. Webster et al., 
Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming 
Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1845 (2005), http://science.sciencemag. 
org/content/sci/309/5742/1844.full.pdf. 
 14.   See WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE 
SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 9 (2017), https://tidesandcurrents. 
noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Regional_SLR_Scenarios_for_th
e_US_final.pdf; Tim Faulkner, Ocean State Sea Level-Rise Estimate Now Above 
9 Feet, ECORI NEWS (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.ecori.org/climate-
change/2017/2/12/sea-level-rise-estimate-now-above-9-feet.  
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surge battering properties from the seaward side and more rainfall 
flowing into properties from the landward side.15  All of these 
factors combined paint a bleak future for the NFIP unless changes 
are made to fortify the program and better characterize future flood 
risk. 
One of the major concerns in low-lying coastal areas is that the 
NFIP flood insurance risk maps (FIRMs) are based on historical 
flooding data and do not take into account sea level rise forecasts 
from climate-change modeling.16  Rhode Island has been on the 
forefront of advocating for the consideration of sea level rise 
projections into the NFIP maps and policies, but, thus far, FEMA 
has taken only rudimentary steps to address this suggestion.17  
Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) 
has spearheaded a large effort to create maps and tools to visualize 
future flooding risk under different sea level rise scenarios, and 
remains concerned that not taking these threats seriously could 
result in liability lawsuits against the state and federal 
governments;18 however, options available to Rhode Island to spur 
federal change are limited. 
This Comment explores the complex problem of insuring Rhode 
Island coastal property in a changing environment.  First, it 
discusses climate change issues that will impact the Rhode Island 
coast in the coming century, including the resultant threats to 
coastal populations and infrastructure.  Second, it provides an 
overview of the NFIP, including the creation of FIRMs, recent 
efforts by Congress to reform the NFIP, and the ineffectiveness of 
the current 2012 FEMA flood maps for Rhode Island.  This 
Comment also explores suggested flood maps generated by CRMC, 
innovative ways those maps can be used, including STORMTOOLS, 
 
 15.   See LEANNA HEFFNER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE & RHODE ISLAND’S 
COASTS:  PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 6 (2012), http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/climate_summary.pdf.  
 16.   See TECHNICAL MAPPING ADVISORY COUNCIL, FUTURE CONDITIONS RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND MODELING 1 (2015) [hereinafter TMAC REPORT], 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1454954261186-c348aa9b1768298c 
9eb66f84366f836e/TMAC_2015_Future_Conditions_Risk_Assessment_and_M
odeling_Report.pdf.  
 17.   See, e.g., id. at 1–27 (providing recommendations to counsel FEMA 
regarding implementation of sea level rise projections into mapping). 
 18.   See RI Shoreline Change Special Area Management Plan: 
STORMTOOLS, BEACH SAMP [hereinafter STORMTOOLS], http://www. 
beachsamp.org/stormtools/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).  
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and explains how property owners currently can challenge the 
validity of FEMA flood maps.  Third, this Comment analyzes 
whether Rhode Island can legally challenge the 2012 FEMA maps 
based on the argument that the maps do not consider sea level rise 
projections and, if the 2012 FEMA maps are not updated per Rhode 
Island’s request, the government could be liable for future flood 
damage resulting from climate change.  Fourth, this Comment 
briefly touches upon ways that Rhode Island could be held liable for 
permitting decisions based on FIRMs that the state knows are—
and openly touts as—inaccurate.  Finally, this Comment will 
conclude that the current legal options available to Rhode Island 
are limited, but FEMA has taken actions that indicate it is 
considering how best to maintain the solvency of the NFIP and how 
to incorporate growing concerns related to sea level rise. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Climate Change Impacts in Rhode Island 
The verdict is in on climate change:  climate change is real, it 
is occurring at rates that exceed projections, and it is exacerbated 
by human actions.19  Greenhouse gases released from the burning 
of fossil fuels trap heat in our atmosphere, resulting in increasing 
air temperatures.  Global atmospheric temperatures have 
increased by over 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit since the pre-Industrial 
era, with each of the last three decades being successively warmer 
than the last.20  This increase in air temperature, in turn, has 
resulted in an increase of nearly 0.8 degrees Fahrenheit in global 
sea surface temperatures.21  Air temperatures in New England are 
expected to increase an additional three to six degrees Fahrenheit 
by 2080,22 with associated sea surface temperature increases that 
 
 19.  See e.g., Naomi Oreskes, The verdict is in on climate change: When it 
comes to climate change, open-mindedness is the wrong approach, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-oreskes-
judging-climate-change-20120122. 
 20.  See RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS 
REPORT: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
40 (Keigo Akimoto et al. eds., 2015), http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ 
ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf. 
 21.  Id.  This temperature increase was measured in the upper 250 feet. 
Id. 
 22.  Radley Horton et al., Northeast, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 374 (Jerry M. 
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will most strongly impact the Northern Hemisphere.23  Warmer sea 
surface temperatures then impact Rhode Island in two ways: (1) 
warmer waters expand in a process called thermal expansion, 
contributing to sea level rise;24 and (2) warmer waters serve as fuel 
for coastal storms, increasing the intensity of tropical storms and 
hurricanes.25 
The global sea level has increased by an average rate of 0.7 
inches per year in the twentieth century, and, since 1930, Rhode 
Island has experienced an average sea level rise increase of 0.1 
inches per year with a six-inch rise since 1970.26  The northeast—
including Rhode Island—has experienced sea level rise rates three 
to four times higher than the global average;27 levels are projected 
to increase by over nine feet by 2100.28 
The relationship between warmer sea surface temperatures 
and tropical storms is more complex than the relationship between 
warmer sea surface temperatures and sea level rise, but projections 
have shown that hurricane wind speeds increase by about five 
percent per every 3.15 degree Fahrenheit increase in sea surface 
temperatures, resulting in increased storm surge on top of an 
already rising sea level29 and up to twenty percent more rainfall 
 
Melillo et al. eds., 2014).  This assumes that greenhouse gas emissions are 
substantially reduced; if greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced, then there 
could be an increase of over 4.5 to ten degrees Fahrenheit.  Id.  
 23.  See PACHAURI ET AL., supra note 20, at 60.  
 24.  See, e.g., Church et al., supra note 13, at 1150–51.  Sea level rise is 
also impacted by the melting of land-based ice sheets and local magnitude of 
isostatic rebound, which are beyond the scope of this article.  See id. at 1151–
55. 
 25.  See Webster et al., supra note 13, at 1845–46. 
 26.  See HEFFNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 7; SEA LEVEL RISE IN RHODE 
ISLAND: TRENDS AND IMPACTS 2 (2013), http://www.beachsamp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/climate_SLR_factsheet2013.pdf. 
 27.  See Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr. et al., Hotspot of Accelerated Sea-Level 
Rise on the Atlantic Coast of North America, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1 
(2012), http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v2/n12/full/nclimate1597. 
html. 
 28.  See SWEET ET AL., supra note 14, at 23; Faulkner, supra note 14. 
 29.  Thomas R. Knutson & Robert E. Tuleya, Tropical Cyclones and 
Climate Change: Revisiting Recent Studies at GFDL, in CLIMATE EXTREMES 
AND SOCIETY 120, 121 (H. F. Diaz & R. J. Murnane eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
Tropical Cyclones]; see generally Thomas R. Knutson & Robert E. Tuleya, 
Impact of CO2-Induced Warming on Simulated Hurricane Intensity and 
Precipitation: Sensitivity to the Choice of Climate Model and Convective 
Parameterization, 17 (No. 18) J. OF CLIMATE 3477 (2004) [hereinafter Impact of 
CO2-Induced Warming].  
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within sixty miles of the storm center.30 
All of these factors combine to threaten more Rhode Island 
infrastructure with more frequent flooding, more intense coastal 
storms, and heavier precipitation events.  This will cause more 
damage to structures currently in the NFIP flood zone, and will 
threaten properties with flooding that have historically been 
beyond the reach of the encroaching waters. 
B. The National Flood Insurance Program 
Recognizing the need for flood insurance and the private 
insurance market’s inability to provide coverage, Congress enacted 
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).31  This Act 
authorizes FEMA to offer primary flood insurance to properties 
with significant flood risk, and to incentivize community action to 
reduce flood risk through adoption of floodplain management 
standards.32  Communities that wish to participate in the NFIP 
must voluntarily take action to establish and work toward 
floodplain management standards.33  At the time of the enactment 
of this Act and continuing through today, it is not economical for 
private insurance companies to provide flood insurance to the wide 
range of individuals in need of protection on affordable terms and 
conditions.34  Congress agreed that the federal government would 
provide flood insurance to those in high-risk areas, and private 
insurance companies would direct the sale and management of the 
policies.35  Currently, all thirty-nine municipalities and one Tribal 
Nation in Rhode Island participate in the NFIP.36 
FEMA implements a Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning 
(MAP) process, which facilitates Flood Insurance Studies (FIS) to 
produce FIRMs.37  One category in the FIRMs is Special Flood 
 
 30.  Tropical Cyclones, supra note 29, at 120, 131.  
 31.  42 U.S.C.A. § 4001(b)–(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327); 
BROWN, supra note 4, at 1. 
 32.  See § 4001(d) (Westlaw). 
 33.  See id. § 4001(e) (Westlaw). 
 34.  Id. § 4001(b)(1) (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 1. 
 35.  See BROWN, supra note 4, at 11–12.  
 36.  Michelle Burnett, Assistant Chief of Planning, R.I. Emergency Mgmt. 
Agency, Presentation at the Rhode Island League of Cities and Towns 
Convention: National Flood Insurance Program; What Changes Are 
Happening in Rhode Island? 5 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.rileague.org/ 
DocumentCenter/View/158. 
 37.  See id. at 6, 8. 
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Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which indicate that an area is exposed to 
at least a one-in-one-hundred year risk of annual flooding.38  Within 
these SFHAs, property owners are required to purchase flood 
insurance as a condition of receiving a federally-backed mortgage,39 
and it has been estimated that at least seventy-seven percent of all 
mortgages in the SFHA are subject to the requirement to have flood 
insurance, whether it is through the NFIP or another provider.40  
In Rhode Island, there are approximately 16,000 structures in the 
SFHA, and about 9,600 of those have flood insurance covering over 
$3.8 billion in property; there are over 16,000 flood insurance 
policies statewide, both in and out of the SFHA.41 
Congress intended for the NFIP to be actuarial-based, but it 
recognized that was not feasible given the challenges of 
implementing a new program on already existing structures in the 
 
 38.  See id. at 4.  A one-in-one-hundred year risk of flooding means that 
each year there is a one percent chance of the property flooding, and flooding 
in a specific year does not impact the independent chance of flooding in 
subsequent years. Robert R. Holmes, Jr., The 100-Year Flood—It’s All About 
Chance, USGS, https://water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood-basic.html (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2016). 
 39.  Burnett, supra note 36, at 9.  Lenders that provide federally-backed 
mortgages includes federal agency lenders, such as the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs, Federal National Mortgage Associate and Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively), and 
federally insured lending institutions, such as all banks covered by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See Home Loans, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/index.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 
2017); Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 
https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddie Mac/ 
Pages/About-Fannie-Mae-Freddie-Mac.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); Bank 
Data & Statistics, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www. 
fdic.gov/bank/statistical/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).  
 40.  RICHARD J. TOBIN & CORINNE CALFEE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MANDATORY PURCHASE REQUIREMENT: POLICIES, 
PROCESSES, AND STAKEHOLDERS 31 (2005), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1602-20490-9257/nfip_eval_mandatory_purchase_ 
requirement.pdf. 
 41.  R.I. COMM’N TO STUDY ECON. RISK DUE TO FLOODING & SEA RISE, 
SPECIAL HOUSE COMMISSION TO STUDY ECONOMIC RISK DUE TO FLOODING AND 
SEA LEVEL RISE: FINAL REPORT 6 (2016), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/ 
commissions/fsrcomm/commdocs/20160512%20Economic%20Risk%20Due%20
to%20Flooding%20and%20Sea%20Level%20Rise%20-%20final.pdf; Burnett, 
supra note 36, at 5.  Structures in the SFHA may not have flood insurance for 
a number of reasons including, but not limited to, not having a federally-
backed mortgage either through obtaining private financing or having paid off 
the mortgage.  Id. at 4.  Structures outside of the SFHA can voluntarily 
purchase private flood insurance.  Id.  
514 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:506 
newly designated SFHA.  To that end, Congress directed FEMA not 
to charge actuarial-based rates for properties constructed before 
December 31, 1974, or before the date that FEMA published the 
first FIRM for the community, whichever came later.42  Given that 
government-provided flood insurance is not actuarial-based, the 
NFIP is funded through a combination of premiums on flood 
insurance policies, annual appropriations from Congress, and by 
borrowing from the United States Treasury when the NFIP has 
insufficient funds to cover losses.43  High rates of subsidy combined 
with recent natural disasters that resulted in catastrophic losses 
(i.e., Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Gulf Coast and 
Superstorm Sandy in the Northeast) have led to a $23 billion debt 
to the United States Treasury, which is perilously close to the 
$30.425 billion borrowing cap set by Congress.44  FEMA reported to 
Congress that “it likely will not generate sufficient revenues to 
repay the billions of dollars borrowed from the [Treasury]” to cover 
NFIP claims from recent major storms including Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in 2005, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012, or 
“potential claims related to future catastrophic losses.”45  FEMA 
also states that this inability to repay NFIP debt stems from the 
intentional design of the program to not be actuarially sound, and 
a return to solvency will take a combination of committed FEMA 
leadership and congressional action.46 
 
 42.  42 U.S.C.A. § 4015(c)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).  
These “pre-FIRM” structures would move to a full actuarial rate for flood 
insurance if they were substantially improved at any time after the community 
adopted FIRM maps, accounting for approximately seventeen percent of all 
NFIP policies. BROWN, supra note 4 at 14.  In addition, FEMA allows 
“grandfathered” properties to maintain their flood insurance class rates even 
if their property is remapped into a new flood zone, but does not consider it a 
subsidy even though property owners pay less than actuarial rates.  NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., AFFORDABILITY OF NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM PREMIUMS: REPORT 1 43 (2015); NFIP GRANDFATHERING RULES FOR 
AGENTS 1 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1488482596393-
dcc52e6c120c9327dcd75f1c08e802e4/Grand fatheringForAgents_03_2016.pdf.  
Sea level rise and increasing storm surge will likely result in more properties 
being grandfathered, which would further increase the number of policy 
holders paying less-than-actuarial rates.  See 44 C.F.R. § pt. 61, app. A(1) 
(2003), WL 44 CFR § pt.61, app. A(1) . 
 43.  42 U.S.C.A.  § 4017(b) (Westlaw). 
 44.  Id. § 4016(a) (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 24. 
 45.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-317, HIGH-RISK SERIES: 
PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON 
OTHERS 619 (2017) [hereinafter GAO 2017]. 
 46.  See id. at 619, 625. 
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In recent years, more fiscally conservative Congresses have 
recognized the need to move the NFIP to actuarial-based rates.  To 
that end, the Biggert-Waters Act was passed in 2012.47  Among 
other items, the Biggert-Waters Act required that FEMA move the 
highest-risk policies to actuarial rates in a phased approach, phase 
out grandfathered policy rates, prohibit subsidized rates on 
properties purchased after the enactment of the Act, and improve 
flood risk mapping.48  Biggert-Waters also required FEMA to form 
a Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC) that, among other 
mandates, was required to develop recommendations on how to 
ensure that FEMA uses the best available science when considering 
the impact of sea level rise.49  TMAC released its report in 
December 2015, and outlined how FEMA should incorporate future 
conditions as a result of sea level rise into the FIS process, including 
collaborations with other federal agencies and local communities.50  
The report was submitted to the FEMA Administrator in July 2016 
for his consideration, but there is no requirement that FEMA 
actually adopts the recommendations or includes sea level rise 
projections in future FISs and FIRMs.51 
Following the enactment of the Biggert-Waters Act, there was 
an immediate and vocal outcry from the public as to what actuarial 
rates would mean for individual pocketbooks, and Congress 
responded with the Grimm-Waters Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA).52  The HFIAA repealed many 
portions of Biggert-Waters, returned grandfathered policies to the 
NFIP, and greatly slowed the move toward actuarial rates.53 
 
 47.  Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4131). 
 48.  See id. §§ 4012, 4014–4015, 4101a(c) (Westlaw); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-59, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
CONTINUED PROGRESS NEEDED TO FULLY ADDRESS PRIOR GAO 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RATE-SETTING METHODS 6–7 (2016) [hereinafter GAO 
2016]. 
 49.  See § 4101a.  HFIAA did not repeal the TMAC provisions of Biggert-
Waters.  See GAO 2016, supra note 48, at 7. 
 50.  See TMAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1–27. 
 51.  Technical Mapping Advisory Council: TMAC Reports and 
Recommendations, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/technical-mapping-advisory-
council (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
 52.  Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (2014) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4131). 
 53.  See GAO 2016, supra note 48, at 7. 
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C. FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps for Rhode Island 
In 2012, FEMA developed new FIRMs for Rhode Island.  These 
maps, developed with community input, must be adopted by 
communities for its properties to qualify for NFIP-provided flood 
insurance.54  Recognizing that errors can persist in FIRMs, FEMA 
allows individuals and communities to petition for maps to be 
amended.55  For example, individuals may claim that they are not 
required to purchase flood insurance by requesting a Letter of Map 
Amendment (LOMA) stating that the FIRM did not account for the 
natural elevation of a property and, when properly taken into 
consideration, that the property is not in an SFHA.56  Communities 
may request a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) stating that the 
community has implemented a physical development that resulted 
in reduced flood risk to areas previously mapped in the floodplain.57  
For both LOMAs and LOMRs, the request to correct a map and 
FEMA’s subsequent decision to do so must be based on scientific 
information that invalidates the current map; furthermore, in most 
cases, the cost to request a map change and correct the map is borne 
by the individual or the community.58 
After the 2012 FIRMs were published, Rhode Island experts 
and regulators noticed inaccuracies: the maps miscategorized risk 
throughout Narragansett Bay by failing to properly account for 
natural elevation on individual properties or recent flood-reduction 
projects implemented by communities.59  Rhode Island believes the 
 
 54.  See BROWN, supra note 4, at 4.  After FEMA develops preliminary 
FIRMs, they present the maps to local officials at Consultation Coordinator 
Officer (CCO) meetings and to the general public at Open Houses. The Risk 
MAP Flood Risk Project Lifestyle: Preliminary FIRM Issuance, FEMA, 
https://www.fema.gov/risk-map-flood-risk-project-lifecycle (last visited Mar. 
30, 2017).  At these meetings, FEMA explains the maps and any changes in 
flood risk categorization, if applicable. Id.  Local officials and the general public 
can provide feedback at this time, but there is no obligation to address the 
individual concerns.  See id.  After a public notification process, there is a 
ninety-day comment period for anyone to challenge that the maps are 
scientifically or technically incorrect, submitting data supporting their stance 
that will inform revision.  Id. 
 55.  BROWN, supra note 4, at 5. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Telephone Interview with Teresa Crean, Coastal Research Assoc., 
Community Planning and Coastal Resilience (Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter 
Crean Telephone Interview]. 
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FIRMs overestimate flood risk in the Upper Bay and underestimate 
flood risk along the South Shore and in South County in light of 
detailed sea level rise projections.60 
There is no mechanism within the NFIA for a state to challenge 
the full suite of FIRMs, but FEMA, responding to Rhode Island’s 
concerns, stated that FIRMs are not scientifically or technically 
inaccurate since the maps must only be based on historical data.61  
Therefore, FIRMs cannot be appealed for failing to account for 
climate change.62  Rhode Island looked for formal ways to challenge 
the FIRMs outside of the NFIA, and filed a request for 
determination of consistency under the Coastal Zone Management 
Act in August and October of 2012.63  To date, the requests have 
gone unanswered. 
D. FEMA Consideration of Sea Level Rise 
In December 2015, the FEMA TMAC recognized the need to 
include future conditions risk assessment and modeling in their 
floodplain mapping, shifting away from the current method of 
analyzing flood risk as a snapshot in time.64  As part of this 
assessment, TMAC recommended providing policy options and 
information to coastal communities that would include the future 
effects of long-term erosion and sea level rise.65  However, FEMA 
stopped short of requiring communities to adopt FIRMs 
incorporating sea level rise projections based on the best science 
available, stating instead that “it is necessary to examine a range 
of scenarios that reflect . . . plausible future states . . . . 
 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.; Patrick Anderson, CRMC: Federal Flood Maps Flawed, 
PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://pbn.com/CRMC-Federal-flood-
maps-flawed,93644?print=1.  
 62.  See Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59; Anderson, supra note 
61.  
 63.  Anderson, supra note 61.  Generally, federal consistency requires that 
federal actions, within and outside the coastal zone, which have reasonably 
foreseeable effects [on the coastal zone] be consistent with the enforceable 
policies of a state’s federally-approved coastal management program.  Federal 
actions include federal agency activities, federal license or permit activities, 
and federal financial assistance activities. Federal Consistency, NAT’L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.: OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT., 
https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/consistency/ (last updated Nov. 21, 2016). 
 64.  See TMAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.  The TMAC assessment was 
conducted per the Biggert-Waters Act.  Id. at 2. 
 65.  See id. at 10–15. 
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Communities should be consulted to determine which scenarios and 
time horizons to map . . . .”66  TMAC also recommended supporting 
demonstration projects to develop future conditions data, 
evaluating the costs and benefits of different flood risk mapping 
projections, and serving as informational examples to other 
communities across the United States.67 
In October 2016, FEMA announced that it would work with 
New York City to revise its flood maps following the Mayor de 
Blasio administration’s appeal of the 2015 preliminary FIRMs, 
which placed 35,000 more homes and buildings in the city into the 
highest flood risk areas.68  As part of the agreement, FEMA will 
produce new preliminary FIRMs that account for climate change 
projections, including sea level rise and storm surge as guided by 
the New York City Panel on Climate Change.69  While New York 
City has initiated a collaboration with FEMA to consider sea level 
rise in FIRMs, the path is less clear for the State of Rhode Island. 
III. ANALYSIS 
First, this Section describes current prohibitions on federal 
government liability for flood-related damage and provides a 
potential argument for government liability should that prohibition 
change.  It then suggests an approach for Rhode Island to directly 
challenge inaccurate FIRMs to establish government liability even 
though there is an explicit mechanism for states to do so.  This 
Comment then transitions to the potential liability that Rhode 
Island face for continuing to issue building permits in areas it 
 
 66.  Id. at 14. 
 67.  Id. at 22–23. 
 68.  Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Mayor de Blasio and 
FEMA Announce Plan to Revise NYC’s Flood Maps (Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter 
Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, NYC Flood Map Revision], 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/10/17/mayor-de-blasio-and-fema-
announce-plan-revise-nycs-flood-maps. Following Superstorm Sandy, FEMA 
reevaluated and issued new preliminary FIRMs that increased the number of 
properties required to purchase flood insurance under the NFIP by enlarging 
the SFHAs. See Evan Lehmann, New York City, a Climate Change Leader, 
Challenges Enlarged Flood Maps, E&E NEWS (Sept. 8, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060024322.  This led to New York challenging 
the preliminary FIRMs; as a community, New York City is better positioned to 
challenge FEMA preliminary FIRMs than the State of Rhode Island.  See id. 
(noting New York City’s “infinitely valuable” real estate).  
 69.  See Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, NYC Flood Map 
Revision, supra note 68. 
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knows to be in SFHA if FIRMs were based on sea level rise 
projections, and concludes by addressing the ever-present state 
concern of its action being deemed a government taking. 
A. Federal Government Liability 
Government actions are shielded from liability claims due to 
sovereign immunity and the discretionary function, as well as acts 
of God.  However, sea level rise may be eroding these protections as 
scientific sea level rise projections become more sophisticated and 
accurate.  Sea level rise is more accurately described as a 
projectable environmental change than an act of God, and it is 
becoming less reasonable to disregard.  In absence of these broad 
protections, FEMA may be susceptible to a negligence claim that 
FIRMs failed to incorporate sea level rise projects.70 
1. Liability for Flood Damage Statutorily Prohibited 
Federal statutory law categorically states, “[n]o liability of any 
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage 
from or by floods or flood waters at any place . . . .”71  However, 
“decisions which impose liability on the United States for damages 
from flooding [involve] . . . government conduct ‘wholly unrelated to 
any [A]ct of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for 
flood control, or any act [under]taken pursuant to [any] such 
authorization.’”72  This has been interpreted as limiting liability for 
damages from flooding and constitutes “negligence of the United 
States unconnected with any congressionally-mandated flood 
control initiative.”73  Thus, FEMA is not liable for damages from 
inaccurate FIRMs, since FIRMs are an integral part of a 
congressionally-mandated flood control initiative.74 
 
 70.  See, e.g., Jennifer Klein, Potential Liability of Governments for Failure 
to Prepare for Climate Change, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE L., Aug. 2015, at 1, 6–14, http://wordpress. ei.columbia.edu/climate-
change-law/files/2016/06/Klein-2015-08-Liability-US-Gov-Failure-to-Prep-
Climate-Change.pdf (describing elements of a negligence claim needed to hold 
government liable for refusing to prepare for climate change). 
 71.  33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
 72.  Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1191 (5th Cir. 
1975) (quoting Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966)).  
 73.  Britt v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (M.D. Ala. 1981). 
 74.  See id.; see also Kmart Corp. v. Kroger Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d 605, 622–
23 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (city was immune from suit after operating ten-acre 
landfill for dirt in floodplain adjacent to Kmart store because decision involved 
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2. Exhibiting Due Care Requires Consideration of Sea Level Rise 
Even if there were no statutory prohibition on liability for 
damages from flooding, or if FIRMs were deemed an exception to 
this prohibition, sovereign immunity provides a second barrier of 
protection for federal government actions; however, under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),75 sovereign immunity can be 
waived.76  One of the broadest exceptions to the FTCA that 
continues to shield government actions from tort claims is the 
discretionary immunity function, which states that the FTCA shall 
not apply to: 
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a 
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or 
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not 
the discretion involved be abused.77 
Commentators have argued that the primary counter to an 
FTCA argument for discretionary immunity function is that FEMA 
did not exercise due care when issuing FIRMs based solely on 
historical data and not incorporating sea level rise projections.78  
For this claim to be successful, the risk of flooding must be so 
foreseeable as to establish that FEMA owed a duty to the property 
owner, and that FEMA breached that duty by not including sea 
level rise projections where a reasonable agency in FEMA’s position 
 
social, economic, or political policy).  
 75.  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 113-
4). 
 76.  Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013) (quoting 
Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013)) (“The FTCA ‘was 
designated primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States 
from suits in tort.’”).  
 77.  § 2680(a) (Westlaw) (emphasis added). 
 78.  See, e.g., James Wilkins, Is Sea Level Rise “Foreseeable”? Does it 
Matter?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 437, 486–87, 495–96 (2011); see also JON 
KUSLER, FLOOD RISK IN THE COURTS: REDUCING GOVERNMENT LIABILITY WHILE 
ENCOURAGING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY v (Sam Riley Medlock ed., 2011) 
(noting how 100-year flood’s failure to consider future conditions and high-risk 
factors such as high velocity water and erosion contribute to increase in 
successful common law suits against government).  
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would have done so to protect against the risk.79 
This Comment contends that sea level rise is foreseeable and 
related coastal flooding is a hazard that the federal government 
owes a duty to protect against in the limited context of NFIP-
provided flood insurance by incorporating scientifically-sound sea 
level rise projects in its FIRMs.80  In recent decades, climate change 
projections have sufficiently improved to accurately project sea 
level rise, and each model produces a suite of potential sea level rise 
scenarios ranging from more likely to occur to least likely to occur.  
As climate researchers have observed actual sea level rise and 
compared it to model projections, they see not only that the 
projections are reasonably accurate, but often observe more sea 
level rise than anticipated.81 
To determine whether FEMA breached its duty by not 
including sea level rise projections in FIRMs and is thereby liable 
for subsequent damages, consideration of whether FEMA knew or 
should have known the extent of projected sea level rise in that area 
and the cost-benefit of taking action should be included.82  In Rhode 
Island, it would be nearly impossible for FEMA to claim it did not 
know and should not have known about the risks that sea level rise 
poses for coastal properties.  This is largely due to Rhode Island’s 
extensive efforts to map sea level rise through STORMTOOLS.83  
STORMTOOLS is an online, interactive mapping tool that allows 
the user to look at coastal storms of various strengths in 
combination with two, three, and five feet of sea level rise, allowing 
visualization of the extent of flooding under different scenarios to 
the entire Rhode Island coastline down to individual properties.84  
FEMA is aware of this extensive effort, of the diverging risk 
 
 79.  See Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local 
Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 775, 785–87 (2013) (applying duty and reasonable care analysis against 
local governments for failing to adequately recognize climate change). 
 80.  See id. at 786. 
 81.  See Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared 
to Projections, 316 SCI. 709, 709 (2007), http://science.sciencemag. 
org/content/316/5825/709. 
 82.  See Burkett, supra note 79, at 786–87. 
 83.  STORMTOOLS, supra note 18. 
 84.  STORMTOOLS, supra note 18; Alex Kuffner, With online tool, you can 
see where R.I. would flood, PROVIDENCE J. (Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/environment/20150101-unique-
online-tool-shows-potential-for-catastrophic-flooding-in-rhode-island-
interactive.ece. 
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assessment between STORMTOOLS and the 2012 FIRMs, and of 
Rhode Island’s goal that future FIRMs will be informed by this 
model.85  Given the level of dialogue between the state and federal 
agencies, it would be unlikely that a court would find that FEMA 
was not aware of the impact of sea level rise on Rhode Island coasts. 
B. Special Standing for Rhode Island to Challenge FIRMs 
Should the statutory provision prohibiting federal liability for 
damages caused by flooding fall by the wayside and Rhode Island 
decide to challenge the agency decision to not include sea level rise 
projections in FIRMs, then a subsequent obstacle could be Rhode 
Island establishing standing.86  Because sea level rise is occurring 
at a relatively slow rate with noticeable changes only becoming 
apparent decades in the future, Rhode Island could face obstacles 
when showing that it suffered a concrete and particularized injury 
that is either actual or imminent.87  However, in the landmark 
decision Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge an EPA 
decision not to regulate carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas, 
providing potential guidance for a Rhode Island challenge to 
FIRMs.88  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that climate 
change is a concrete injury that is already injuring the local, 
national, and global environments.89  Furthermore, Massachusetts 
had a particularized injury as the landowner of a “substantial 
portion of the state’s coastal property” and that injury did not have 
to cease completely due to EPA action, but that the slowing of the 
injury was enough.90 
Here, the connection between FEMA not considering sea level 
rise projections when developing and implementing FIRMs is not 
as straight forward an injury as loss of land due to sea level rise 
found in Massachusetts v. EPA.91  Nonetheless, this does not mean 
 
 85.  Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59.  
 86.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) 
(holding that plaintiff must show that it suffered a concrete and particularized 
injury that is either actual or imminent, the injury is reasonably related to the 
defendant, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a decision favorable to 
plaintiff). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007). 
 89.  Id. at 517, 521–22. 
 90.  Id. at 522, 525–26. 
 91.  Id. at 522–23. 
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that there is not an injury.  Rather, by not including sea level rise 
projections, mandating that communities implement FIRMs could 
result in municipalities and state permitting agencies making 
decisions with regard to coastal development that result in 
increased uninsured losses, and subsequent negative implications 
for the state economy.92  Rhode Island, as the only entity that has 
the authority to issue permits, could be in a unique position with 
regard to standing, similar to Massachusetts as a substantial 
landowner in the state.93  Unlike in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
injury here is more clearly redressed by FEMA action because it 
would eliminate the misalignment between FIRMs and scientific 
information known to Rhode Island, as well as better guide permit 
decisions, which would reduce future injury.94 
C. State and Local Government Liability 
In addition to Rhode Island seeking legal avenues to challenge 
FEMA regarding FIRMs, the state also could be exposed to liability 
for permitting construction in SHFAs when it openly contends that 
the FIRMs are inaccurate.  The FTCA only applies to actions taken 
by the federal government and does not apply to actions taken by 
the State of Rhode Island, or any of its municipalities.95  Many 
states have enacted legislation to protect state government actions 
from liability in a manner similar to the exclusions to the FTCA; 
however, Rhode Island is not such a state.  In contrast, Rhode 
Island explicitly waives sovereign immunity for the state and all 
political subdivisions, making itself liable in tort actions in the 
same manner as a private individual or corporation.96  While on its 
 
 92.  Note that this is an example that has not yet been raised within the 
courts and is provided as a purely hypothetical illustration as to how an 
argument may form. 
 93.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522–23; but see Pennsylvania 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 21–22 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that 
the right of a state to sue encompasses suits either brought to protect its 
proprietary interest or brought to protect “quasi-sovereign” interests, such as 
the general economy of the state. Furthermore, for such a claim the state must 
show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek remedies for injury to 
private parties, who could themselves have prosecuted their own particular 
claims). 
 94.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–23.  
 95.  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671–2680 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327); see 
Amy M. Hackman, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 411–12 (1997). 
 96.  9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.) 
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face this seems to be a liberal policy that opens the state and local 
governments to a broad range of tort actions, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has not applied such a broad interpretation, but 
instead has interpreted it in combination with the public duty 
doctrine to continue to bar many actions against the State.97 
Over the last several decades, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has applied three significant exceptions to the public duty doctrine, 
once again opening state and local governments to tort lawsuits:98 
(1) when the duty arose from an activity “that a private person or 
corporation would be likely to carry out,”99 (2) “when the state has 
knowledge that it has created a circumstance that forces an 
individual into a position of peril and subsequently chooses not to 
remedy the situation,”100 and (3) when a plaintiff is owed a duty in 
his individual capacity.101 
A lawsuit against the State of Rhode Island for permitting 
certain activities in an area that is not listed on FEMA’s FIRM as 
a SFHA, but Rhode Island has knowledge is subject to flooding due 
to sea level rise that would otherwise qualify it as an SFHA, may 
be allowed under the egregious conduct by the state exception.  
State courts have not answered this question, but it would be 
analyzed according to the three-part test described in Haley: 
“(1) Did the state create circumstances that forced a 
reasonably prudent person into a position of extreme peril? 
(2) Did the state have actual or constructive knowledge of 
the perilous circumstances? 
(3) Did the state having been afforded a reasonable amount 
of time to eliminate the dangerous condition, fail to do 
so?”102 
 
(there is a $100,000 cap on recovery under § 9-31-2). 
 97.  See Ryan v. R.I. Dep’t. of Transp., 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1980); 
Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 356–57 (R.I. 1978). 
 98.  See generally Roger Nathaniel LeBoeuf, The Public Duty Doctrine and 
the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act, 43 R.I. B. J. 11 (1995).  
 99.  See Delong v. Prudential Prop. & Cas., 583 A.2d 75, 76 (R.I. 1990); 
O’Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 338 (R.I. 1989); Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 
328, 333 (R.I. 1989).  
 100.  See Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992) (quoting 
Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991)); Bierman v. Shookster, 590 A.2d 
402, 404 (R.I. 1991) (quoting Verity, 585 A.2d at 67). 
 101.  See Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 658–59 (R.I. 1990). 
 102.  LeBoeuf, supra note 98, at 16 (citing Haley, 611 A.2d at 489).  
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Under this framework, a state permit for an activity in an area 
that is not included in a FIRM’s SFHA but would have been if 
FEMA considered sea level rise as suggested by Rhode Island could 
be subject to liability if flood damage occurs without the option for 
the property owner to purchase flood insurance through the 
NFIP.103  By permitting the action, the reasonably prudent person 
who sought out a permit is now in a position of peril, the state has 
actual knowledge of the perilous circumstances, and the state could 
have eliminated the dangerous condition by not issuing the permit; 
however, Florida courts have considered a similar argument where 
a city furnished incorrect FIRMs, resulting in a house that was 
later declared ineligible for the NFIP.104  There, the court held that 
a waiver of sovereign immunity did apply, but that the public duty 
doctrine precluded the city from liability because the city did not 
owe a special duty to the individuals who applied for the building 
permit for their home.105  However, one commentator has noted 
that the discretionary decision of the city was whether or not to 
participate in the NFIP; but once that decision was made, 
complying with the NFIP requirements was mandatory as there are 
substantial penalties for non-enforcement, including not being able 
to continue participation in the primary flood insurance option 
available to individuals.106 
D. Federal Consistency Requirement of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act 
Even if Rhode Island is not able to directly challenge the 
methodology FEMA uses to develop FIRMs, it has a powerful legal 
tool in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): federal 
consistency.107  Under federal consistency requirements, federal 
agencies issuing federal permits and licenses that are reasonably 
likely to affect any land or water use, or natural resources of the 
coastal zone are required to do so in a manner consistent, to the 
maximum extent practicable, with the state’s coastal management 
program developed and implemented under the CZMA.108 
 
 103.  C.f. Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1170 (R.I. 2001). 
 104.  See e.g., City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 So. 2d 1198, 1199–
1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 105.  Id. at 1199.  
 106.  See Wilkins, supra note 78, at 458. 
 107.  16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1464 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 108.  Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw); R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, 
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Rhode Island is a CZMA state; the CRMC implements the 
state’s coastal management program, which is colloquially known 
as the Red Book.109  The Red Book extensively highlights planning 
for sea level rise as a state priority; and the CRMC has statutory 
authority “to develop and adopt policies and regulations necessary 
to manage the coastal resources of the state and protect life and 
property from coastal hazards resulting from projected sea level 
rise and probable increased frequency and intensity of coastal 
storms due to climate change.”110  Furthermore, a stated CRMC 
policy is to “review its policies, plans and regulations to proactively 
plan for and adapt to climate change and sea level rise,” and to 
“integrate climate change and sea level rise scenarios into its 
programs to prepare Rhode Island for these new, evolving 
conditions and make our coastal areas more resilient.”111  CRMC’s 
Federal Consistency Manual includes a list of activities that are 
subject to the federal consistency requirement, including, 
“[r]evisions to Flood Insurance Study and National Flood Insurance 
maps.”112 
CRMC, through its executive director, expressed in writing to 
FEMA a request for determination of federal consistency of the 
2012 FIRMs with the CRMC Red Book.113  FEMA’s response will 
dictate the next steps taken by Rhode Island’s CRMC. 
E. Takings 
Assuming that Rhode Island is able to successfully challenge 
FEMA’s decision to not include sea level rise projections in FIRMs, 
or FEMA voluntarily adopts the TMAC recommendations and 
incorporates sea level rise—neither of which are on the immediate 
horizon—then Rhode Island and the federal government could face 
yet another legal hurdle from property owners: violations of the 
 
COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM § 400, pp. 1–2 (2012), 
http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/7823.pdf 
[hereinafter The Red Book]. 
 109.  46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)(v)(B) (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. 
Sess.); The Red Book, supra note 108, at § 145, p. 5. 
 110.  § 46-23-6(2) (Westlaw).   
 111.  The Red Book, supra note 108, at § 145, p. 6. 
 112.  Id. § 400, p. 1; R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, FEDERAL 
CONSISTENCY MANUAL: DIRECT FEDERAL ACTIVITIES 27, http://sos.ri.gov/ 
documents/archives/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/CRMC _1059_.pdf.  
 113.  Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59; Anderson, supra note 61.  
2017] NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 527 
Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment.114  The Takings 
Clause states that the government may not take private property 
for public use without just compensation.115  Some have suggested 
that the elimination of flood insurance subsidies under the NFIP 
could be a regulatory taking should it result in reduced property 
value;116 however, courts have been hesitant to award 
compensation to private property owners based on the expectation 
that a subsidy continue.117 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has authority over 
complicated and often contentious agreements between private 
landowners and the federal government as to water allocation 
rights and water purchase prices, has held that the government’s 
changes to pricing provisions, which reduced the level of subsidy at 
the time of contract renewal, are permissible even when the policy 
shift was drastic and likely caused business disruptions that were 
based on an expectation that the subsidy would continue.118  
Furthermore, the expectation that a subsidy will continue 
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indefinitely is not a protected property interest.119  Therefore, the 
elimination of flood insurance subsidies through the NFIP that 
result in a decrease in private property value would not likely be a 
regulatory taking.120 
The courts could find that there was a government regulatory 
taking should the reduction or elimination of flood insurance 
subsidies result in a total diminution of property value.121 As 
regulations that result in total diminution in value are considered 
per se takings, no balancing of the factors considered in the Penn 
Central analysis is necessary.122  This is not an unfathomable 
result of drastic changes to the NFIP’s FIRM development process.  
Homeowners could argue that implementation of actuarial-based 
rates resulted in not being able to pay flood insurance premiums, 
which led to subsequent cancellation of their flood insurance 
policies.  Without flood insurance, the homeowners would fail to 
meet the requirements of their federally-backed mortgage, and 
thus, would be forced to sell their homes.  This in itself may not be 
enough to constitute a taking, but if the actuarial-based flood 
insurance essentially drives all potential buyers from the market, 
then the homeowners could argue that their property has no 
market value; however, the analysis does not end there.  The 
homeowner would have to go one step further than merely 
presenting evidence that the market value of the home is 
completely diminished; the homeowner would have to show that the 
property has no economic value of any kind for a regulatory taking 
to have occurred, a showing of which only a few homeowners have 
been successful.123  In addition to a high bar to show a complete 
diminution of all economic value, the state and federal government 
have no obligation to subsidize flood insurance, so an elimination of 
the subsidy is unlikely to constitute a taking.124 
Despite the low likelihood of a court determining that the 
elimination or reduction of flood insurance subsidies would be a 
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, governments at all 
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levels, particularly state and local governments, are overly cautious 
when implementing regulatory changes that may raise the specter 
of takings.125 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Realistically, there are limited legal avenues for the State of 
Rhode Island to pursue in order to challenge the full suite of FIRMs 
for state coastal areas that do not incorporate sea level rise 
projections; there are also limitations on Rhode Island’s liability for 
complying with the FIRMs even when Rhode Island has scientific 
information that the FIRMS are not accurate.  Challenges at both 
the federal and state levels are prevented by statutory prohibitions 
on government liability for damages caused by flooding, sovereign 
immunity, and public policy doctrine, in addition to an aversion to 
running crosswise with the takings doctrine.  There may be a path 
forward through requiring FIRMs that are consistent with state 
regulations under the federal consistency clause of the CZMA, 
which expressly states that preparation for and adaptation to sea 
level rise is a priority in Rhode Island.  There are recent indications 
from FEMA that it plans to more seriously consider incorporating 
sea level rise projections into FIRMs, and it recently agreed to work 
with New York City to do so following Superstorm Sandy.126 
Rhode Island has compiled and assessed vast data to develop 
STORMTOOLS to interactively illustrate the impact of sea level 
rise down to the individual parcel level along the state’s coasts.  
Rhode Island is cutting-edge in regards to embracing climate 
change projections, particularly sea level rise, due to the relatively 
large impact on the small state; but there are indications that other 
states are catching up in their planning strategies.  If sea level rise 
continues to impact coastal communities and strong coastal storms 
continue to cause substantial damage, Rhode Island is well situated 
to be the first state to work with FEMA to develop comprehensive 
FIRMs that incorporate sea level rise. 
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